Apr. 18th, 2006 04:12 pm
Case in point
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textualdevianceOkay, so I love my law class, even though I missed a few questions on our quiz today (got a couple of cases confused, dammit.)
And then I just saw this ruling.
This is almost identical to a case we discussed in class. And it works on a similar principle to this case, which I'm hoping will get dismissed for similar reasons.
To those who don't understand the principle at work here, let me explain:
The First Amendment's guaranteed freedoms are not absolute. They are limited automatically to a few circumstances (it's more complex than this, and there are more limitations, but for the purposes of this issue, these are the restrictions that matter):
1. Public spaces
2. Private spaces that one personally owns.
For example, one may have the right to peaceably assemble, but one doesn't have the right to peaceably assemble in one's neighbor's living room if one's neighbor doesn't approve. Hence trespassing laws.
Likewise, there is no requirement that a privately-owned space has to support free speech of anyone who walks in. If Joe Schmoe's Pub wants to kick out some guy who comes in ranting against the local football team, Joe has the right to do so. He is not infringing on that person's right to rant against the football team, merely telling him he needs to find another place at which to do so.
You can think of this as "the soapbox rule" extending from the Miami Herald case that struck down a Florida law requiring media to grant space to people rebutting editorials.
One may say anything one wants to say in a publicly-owned space or in one's private space.
However, people are not required to:
1. Provide a soapbox, funding, airtime or other means of increasing the volume of the message.
2. Stand and listen. No-one is entitled to a captive audience.
3. Agree with or support contentions.
4. NOT challenge contentions. One may have the right to say "redheads are obnoxious" but someone else has the right to say, "no they're not, and here's why you're wrong."
This is similar to the principle of: I support your right to believe as you will. I do not have to support your beliefs.
Likewise, there are other proper restrictions on First Amendment freedoms. The most famous, of course, is that you can't yell "fire" in a crowded theater. Or...
1. You may not disturb the peace. Your freedom ends where others' rights begin.
2. You may not incite violence.
3. You may not damage national security (this is a complicated issue, especially now)
4. You may not commit libel.
Additionally, obscenity law is currently under hot debate. Stay tuned for where that settles out.
So, in translation here, the court has ruled that the university is not obligated to provide public funds to this group. No-one is ever entitled to public funding of any kind on principle. Public funding is, and should be, managed on a case by case basis.
Georgia Tech should not be obligated to retain a student who violates its non-discrimination codes. There is a "right" to an education insofar as one cannot be denied it arbitrarily. But conduct requirements are a legitimate part of a school's admissions policies. If they can kick a student out for underage drinking, they can kick one out for writing harassing letters to the school's LGBTA.
What's interesting about this Tech case--and I hope it goes far enough to establish a good case law precedent--is the whole equal protection issue. Or, in other words: these students' rights to practice their religion ends at other students' rights to be free of harassment, intimidation and abuse. The court can't find that there is any sort of right guaranteed in the Constitution to deprive other people of their rights without due process.
The court has guaranteed a lot of freedom of religion rights, even including the use of publicly-funded spaces, provided they're not used for proselytizing, but it has not guaranteed the "right" to express one's religion in a manner that deprives others of their rights. Nope, practicing Aztecs aren't going to have the right to do human sacrifice anytime soon.
The court probably won't establish that, though. The test the court will likely use in this case has to do with whether the codes of conduct are applied in a neutral fashion, which they are. A student who goes into the LGBTA office and starts raving at the "faggots" is going to get disciplinary action regardless of whether he is doing so out of religious belief or just being an asshole. Likewise, it wouldn't matter WHICH religion was inspiring him to do that if he were doing so for religious reasons.
Or, in other words, anti-discrimination laws and policies are not, in themselves, violations of religious freedom because they don't single out specific religions or even religion in general to censor.
Malhotra, in this case, is not being discriminated against because it is her actions that are in violation of the codes of conduct, and not her religious views. She is still--and always will be--entitled to believe being gay is wrong, and is entitled to a certain level of speech about that. But she is not entitled to engage in harassment or creating a hostile environment for other students.
The cases noted in the LA Times article are distinct on this (though they involve private companies and not public universities, the principle is similar):
The AT&T case was won by the ex-employee because the code he was required to sign required him to "respect" differences. The HP case was won by the company because the ex-employee behaved in a manner that created a hostile environment to gay employees.
In other words: thought/private action v. public action.
It's unconstitutional (not to mention impossible) to regulate what goes on in someone's head, what they mutter in the car on the way home or what's in a tartly-worded e-mail they fire off to their best buddy. But it is constitutional to regulate what someone does, whether that's in the workplace or in a classroom. If a person's speech or actions are significantly injurious of others, they cease to be protected by the First Amendment.
The court's determination, then, rests on the definition of harassment, in a legal sense--in whether the school's policy was unfairly vague or unconstitutional about what constitutes harassment, or whether the policy was applied to Malhotra outside of actions that specifically violated the policy.
And then I just saw this ruling.
This is almost identical to a case we discussed in class. And it works on a similar principle to this case, which I'm hoping will get dismissed for similar reasons.
To those who don't understand the principle at work here, let me explain:
The First Amendment's guaranteed freedoms are not absolute. They are limited automatically to a few circumstances (it's more complex than this, and there are more limitations, but for the purposes of this issue, these are the restrictions that matter):
1. Public spaces
2. Private spaces that one personally owns.
For example, one may have the right to peaceably assemble, but one doesn't have the right to peaceably assemble in one's neighbor's living room if one's neighbor doesn't approve. Hence trespassing laws.
Likewise, there is no requirement that a privately-owned space has to support free speech of anyone who walks in. If Joe Schmoe's Pub wants to kick out some guy who comes in ranting against the local football team, Joe has the right to do so. He is not infringing on that person's right to rant against the football team, merely telling him he needs to find another place at which to do so.
You can think of this as "the soapbox rule" extending from the Miami Herald case that struck down a Florida law requiring media to grant space to people rebutting editorials.
One may say anything one wants to say in a publicly-owned space or in one's private space.
However, people are not required to:
1. Provide a soapbox, funding, airtime or other means of increasing the volume of the message.
2. Stand and listen. No-one is entitled to a captive audience.
3. Agree with or support contentions.
4. NOT challenge contentions. One may have the right to say "redheads are obnoxious" but someone else has the right to say, "no they're not, and here's why you're wrong."
This is similar to the principle of: I support your right to believe as you will. I do not have to support your beliefs.
Likewise, there are other proper restrictions on First Amendment freedoms. The most famous, of course, is that you can't yell "fire" in a crowded theater. Or...
1. You may not disturb the peace. Your freedom ends where others' rights begin.
2. You may not incite violence.
3. You may not damage national security (this is a complicated issue, especially now)
4. You may not commit libel.
Additionally, obscenity law is currently under hot debate. Stay tuned for where that settles out.
So, in translation here, the court has ruled that the university is not obligated to provide public funds to this group. No-one is ever entitled to public funding of any kind on principle. Public funding is, and should be, managed on a case by case basis.
Georgia Tech should not be obligated to retain a student who violates its non-discrimination codes. There is a "right" to an education insofar as one cannot be denied it arbitrarily. But conduct requirements are a legitimate part of a school's admissions policies. If they can kick a student out for underage drinking, they can kick one out for writing harassing letters to the school's LGBTA.
What's interesting about this Tech case--and I hope it goes far enough to establish a good case law precedent--is the whole equal protection issue. Or, in other words: these students' rights to practice their religion ends at other students' rights to be free of harassment, intimidation and abuse. The court can't find that there is any sort of right guaranteed in the Constitution to deprive other people of their rights without due process.
The court has guaranteed a lot of freedom of religion rights, even including the use of publicly-funded spaces, provided they're not used for proselytizing, but it has not guaranteed the "right" to express one's religion in a manner that deprives others of their rights. Nope, practicing Aztecs aren't going to have the right to do human sacrifice anytime soon.
The court probably won't establish that, though. The test the court will likely use in this case has to do with whether the codes of conduct are applied in a neutral fashion, which they are. A student who goes into the LGBTA office and starts raving at the "faggots" is going to get disciplinary action regardless of whether he is doing so out of religious belief or just being an asshole. Likewise, it wouldn't matter WHICH religion was inspiring him to do that if he were doing so for religious reasons.
Or, in other words, anti-discrimination laws and policies are not, in themselves, violations of religious freedom because they don't single out specific religions or even religion in general to censor.
Malhotra, in this case, is not being discriminated against because it is her actions that are in violation of the codes of conduct, and not her religious views. She is still--and always will be--entitled to believe being gay is wrong, and is entitled to a certain level of speech about that. But she is not entitled to engage in harassment or creating a hostile environment for other students.
The cases noted in the LA Times article are distinct on this (though they involve private companies and not public universities, the principle is similar):
The AT&T case was won by the ex-employee because the code he was required to sign required him to "respect" differences. The HP case was won by the company because the ex-employee behaved in a manner that created a hostile environment to gay employees.
In other words: thought/private action v. public action.
It's unconstitutional (not to mention impossible) to regulate what goes on in someone's head, what they mutter in the car on the way home or what's in a tartly-worded e-mail they fire off to their best buddy. But it is constitutional to regulate what someone does, whether that's in the workplace or in a classroom. If a person's speech or actions are significantly injurious of others, they cease to be protected by the First Amendment.
The court's determination, then, rests on the definition of harassment, in a legal sense--in whether the school's policy was unfairly vague or unconstitutional about what constitutes harassment, or whether the policy was applied to Malhotra outside of actions that specifically violated the policy.
